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1. Introduction
The issue of how competition aﬀects the stability of banking systems
is not well understood (see Carletti, 2007). Here we study how bank-
ing competition may aﬀect the stability of banking systems by using
the most extensive and consistent databases publicly available.1 We
develop our study by expanding the failure-determinant methodology
to include panel-data techniques and by controlling the eﬀects that
ﬁnancial structure and development may have on the performance
of banking systems. We use internationally comparable banking and
ﬁnancial data for 47 countries between 1990 and 1997.
Our study is motivated by academic and practical concerns. Es-
sentially, it is motivated by the need to understand the nature of this
issue and its implications for the design of policies. Currently there is
no consensus on the theoretical eﬀects that competition may have on
banking fragility. Furthermore, existing empirical studies on the issue
usually provide contradictory results. Indeed in the literature, three
diﬀerent views exist about the relationship between banking com-
petition and ﬁnancial fragility.2 Thus there is no reliable guide for
policy makers regarding how to avoid banking crises in increasingly
competitive banking and ﬁnancial environments.
Here we aim to clarify how banking competition determinants
may relate to ﬁnancial fragility by suggesting answers to the following
questions: What are the main empirical associations between banking
competition and ﬁnancial structure and between banking competition
and ﬁnancial development? How does banking fragility aﬀect the
relationship between banking and ﬁnance? What are the speciﬁc
and joint eﬀects of banking competition determinants on banking
fragility? Are these eﬀects diﬀerentiated? Which type of implications
may be derived from these ﬁndings?
We develop this study by following three steps. First we build
several banking competition indicators based on measures of bank
concentration, domestic origin, public ownership, activity and size of
banks. Later we estimate several OLS regressions to analyse how the
ﬁnancial situation of banking systems (which may or may not involve
1 We use panel-data extracted from the cross-country database on ﬁnancial
development and structure (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000), and
from the one on episodes of systemic and borderline banking crises (see Caprio
and Klingebiel, 2002). The databases are available at the World Banks website:
http://econ.worldbank.org [Titles: “A new database on ﬁnancial development
and structure” and “Episodes of systemic and borderline ﬁnancial crises”].
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a crisis), aﬀect the associations of ﬁnancial structure and ﬁnancial
development with banking competition. Finally we study the eﬀects
of banking determinants on banking fragility with ﬁxed-eﬀects logit
models for panel data. We use individual and principal-components
indicators for the empirical assessments.
We consider that our study has some speciﬁc features that dif-
ferentiate it with respect to other studies. A ﬁrst feature is that
we use internationally comparable banking indicators to develop the
investigation. A second one is that we use logit panel-data models
to assess the determinants of banking fragility. Traditional studies
use multivariate logit techniques. A third one relates to the charac-
terisation of the “stylised facts” between the banking and ﬁnancial
indicators. The last distinctive feature of our study is that we control
for the eﬀects of ﬁnancial structure and development when we assess
the determinants of banking fragility.
Our results have implications for theoretical and policy purposes.
Speciﬁcally, OLS regressions suggest that certain general associations
exist between the banking and ﬁnancial indicators. We denominate
such empirical associations as the stylised facts between banking com-
petition and ﬁnancial systems. These stylised facts suggest that bank-
ing concentration, foreign ownership and the relative activity and size
of banks with respect to those of bank-like institutions are associated
with bank-based ﬁnancial systems and ﬁnancial underdevelopment.
They also suggest that domestically and publicly owned banks may
prevail in market-based and ﬁnancially developed ﬁnancial systems,
at least, during banking crisis episodes.
The models for panel-data show diﬀerentiated eﬀects of the bank-
ing determinants on banking fragility. Particularly the econometric
outcomes suggest that if credit activity relies on banks or if the ﬁ-
nancial system is bank-based, the likelihood of crises will increase.
Another suggestion is that the banking determinants, the features of
the ﬁnancial system and the property regime of banks jointly matter
to analyse the likelihood of crises. Empirically the results support the
view that the relationship between banking competition and ﬁnancial
fragility involves more than a trade-oﬀ. Moreover they support the
idea that ﬁnancial structure matters to assess fragility.
Our investigation complements other papers that analyse the is-
sue of the determinants of banking fragility. Theoretically our ﬁnd-
ings support recent studies that suggest that competition determi-
nants may have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on banking fragility [See Allen
and Gale (2004a) and Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)]. Empirically our
study complements the ﬁndings of other cross-country studies that52 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
have analysed the determinants of banking crises. Speciﬁcally our
ﬁndings complement those that show that weak macroeconomic en-
vironments, cyclical movements, deposit-insurance schemes and weak
law enforcement conditions may encourage banking fragility.3
The paper is divided in eight sections. Section 2 reviews the
literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses method-
ological issues about the OLS assessments. Section 5 extends such
discussion to the failure-determinant methodology. Section 6 char-
acterises the stylised facts associated with the banking and ﬁnancial
indicators. Section 7 shows the eﬀects of banking competition deter-
minants on ﬁnancial fragility. Section 8 summarises and discusses the
main ﬁndings. The appendix shows further econometric estimations
to support the consistency of the ﬁxed-eﬀects logit panel-data models.
2. Banking Competition and Financial Fragility
Academically it has been recognised that the relationship between
banking competition and ﬁnancial fragility is complex and multi-
faceted (see Allen and Gale, 2004a). In fact, there is no consensus
about the nature of this relationship or about its implications for
economic policy. The literature provides several arguments for and
against promoting competition. This seems relatively strange because
policy-makers frequently deal with competition and stability issues at
the same time. Here we review the three main views in the literature
and explain the theoretical foundations of our empirical study.
The ﬁrst view assumes that competition enhances fragility. Em-
pirically, under the explanations of this view, fragility arises due to
agency problems between banks, depositors and deposit insurance
funds or because of non-concentrated banking systems (see Keeley,
1990 and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003). Theoretically this
view is supported by analyses that focus on the risks associated with
competition for deposits, banking deregulation and risk taking be-
haviour of banks (see Matutes and Vives, 1996, Repullo, 2004 and
Dam and Zendejas-Castillo, 2006). Traditionally this view has been
the predominant one in the literature.
The main implication of this view is that concentration or regu-
lations may enhance banking stability. Such implication explains why
the desirability for banking competition has long been questioned. In
addition, it justiﬁes the need for regulation. However this implication
3 See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) for a review of such studies.BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 53
is arguable. For example, some studies show that banking concen-
tration is not negatively correlated to competition (see Claessens and
Laeven, 2004). Furthermore, others point out that the issue of how
competition aﬀects the stability of banking systems and the eﬀective-
ness of regulation is not well understood (see Carletti, 2007).
The second view argues that banking competition enhances ﬁ-
nancial stability. Like the previous view, it also has support from
several studies. Empirically such a view is supported by studies of
the history of US banks and by studies that focus on international
cross-sectional data (see Rolnick and Weber, 1983, and Claessens and
Klingebiel, 2001, respectively). Theoretically, this view is supported
by analyses that argue that competition may enhance stability by
reducing information asymmetries or by increasing liquidity provi-
sions through inter bank markets (see Caminal and Matutes, 2002
and Bossone, 2001, among others).
The main policy implication that arises from this view is that ﬁ-
nancial laissez-faire (or free banking), may be desirable. Particularly,
Dowd (1996) summarises the three main arguments that support such
belief: 1) if free trade is good, there must be a prima facie case in
favour of free trade in banking; 2) if free banking seems strange at
ﬁrst sight, this is because we take certain things for granted (like gov-
ernment intervention in the ﬁnancial sector); 3) empirical evidence is
consistent with free banking theory. Such arguments are supported
by those who claim that banking failures are the indirect result of
regulatory eﬀorts (see Benston and Kaufman, 1996).
The third view suggests that the analysed relationship involves
more than a simple trade-oﬀ. Particularly, Allen and Gale (2004a)
study the eﬃcient levels of competition and stability with several
models. They develop their study with general equilibrium models
of intermediaries and markets, agency models, models of spatial and
Schumpeterian competition and models of contagion. In some of their
models, they ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ but in others there is not. This view may
explain the contradictory results found by researchers. Diﬀerentiated
eﬀects may appear as a result of the assumptions, circumstances and
data used to analyse competition.
The third view also suggests that the eﬀects of competition may
depend on speciﬁc economic conditions. Speciﬁcally Boyd, De Nicolo
and Smith (2004), show that a monopolistic banking system faces a
higher failure probability than a competitive one, when the inﬂation
rate is below certain threshold; otherwise, the opposite conclusion
holds. Furthermore, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that the ef-
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anisms. One is associated with the choice of riskier portfolios when
competition increases. The other is associated with the increase of
default risks when banking markets become more concentrated.
The three views indicated above do not explicitly consider the
ﬁnancial environment in which banking activities are carried out.4
However, the opportunities for ﬁnancial agents to deal with ﬁnancial
risks and to engage in risk sharing activities depend on the particu-
lar properties of the ﬁnancial systems (See Allen and Gale, 2000 and
2004b). We can relate the study of the relationship between banking
competition and ﬁnancial fragility with the theory on comparative
ﬁnancial systems, because such properties depend on ﬁnancial com-
petition. Speciﬁcally, they depend on the competition among banks
and markets, and among banks themselves.
We believe that empirical studies on the relationship between
banking competition and ﬁnancial fragility should include ﬁnancial
system indicators. Methodologically, their inclusion will allow us to
capture the features and properties of ﬁnancial systems. Currently
few studies relate ﬁnancial and fragility indicators (see Ruiz-Porras,
2006 and Loayza and Ranciere, 2006). However none of these studies
is a banking failure-determinant study.5 We believe that this consid-
eration justiﬁes the inclusion of ﬁnancial structure and development
indicators as control variables in assessments regarding the relation-
ship between competition and fragility.
We conclude by indicating that we are far from a consensus re-
garding the eﬀects of banking competition on ﬁnancial fragility. The
literature is rather limited and inconclusive (see Carletti, 2007). Ex-
isting studies show that these eﬀects may not be univocal or straight-
forward. Thus, further studies are necessary for policy purposes.
Particularly, we believe that empirical studies based on the theory
of comparative ﬁnancial systems may be useful to clarify the anal-
ysed relationship. In fact, this theory and the necessity to develop
further research motivate and diﬀerentiate our study. Moreover they
suggest some of its methodological guidelines.
3. Banking and Financial Indicators
Here we describe the ﬁnancial and banking indicators used in our
study. However, before proceeding, we assume certain deﬁnitions for
4 The exception is the paper of Boyd, De Nicolo and Smith (2004).
5 Ruiz-Porras (2006) studies the “stylised facts” that characterise stable and
unstable ﬁnancial systems. Loayza and Ranciere (2006) focus on the determinants
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operative purposes. Speciﬁcally we assume that the competitive fea-
tures of the banking industry can be captured with market structure
data of commercial banks and with the data of bank-like institu-
tions.6 Financial development will mean the level of development of
both intermediaries and markets. Financial structure will refer to
the degree to which a ﬁnancial system is based on intermediaries or
markets. Banking fragility will mean a situation in which systemic or
non-systemic banking crises are present in an economy.
We build the indicators by extracting data from two databases.
Speciﬁcally we build the main indicators with panel-data extracted
from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). Such
data allows us to capture the main features of the ﬁnancial system
and the banking market structure of a country. Furthermore, we use
the database of Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) to build the indicators of
banking fragility. Such indicators include dummies for systemic and
non-systemic crises and a general one for fragility. Methodologically,
the main advantage of using these databases is that it provides us
with consistent data across countries and across time.
The features of the banking and ﬁnancial data are summarised
in the following table:
Table 1
Banking and Financial Data
Deﬁnition Variable Time span Coun- Obser-
tries vations
Banking fragility variables
Dummy variable on sys-
temic episodes of bank-
ing fragility (banking cri-
sis=1; otherwise 0)
SYSTEM 1975-1999 93 113
Dummy variable on non
-systemic episodes of
banking fragility (bank-
ing crisis=1; otherwise 0)
BORDER 1975-1999 44 50
6 Bank-like institutions include intermediaries that accept deposits without
providing transferable deposit facilities and intermediaries that raise funds on the
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Table 1
(continued)
Deﬁnition Variable Time span Coun- Obser-
tries vations
Banking market structure variables
Concentration (Ratio of
the 3 largest banks to to-
tal banking assets)
BCON 1990-1997 137 822
Foreign bank share
(assets)
FBSA 1990-1997 111 673
Share of publicly owned
commercial bank assets
in total commercial bank
assets
PBSA 1980-1997 41 213
Bank-like institution variables
Total assets of other
bank-like institutions to
GDP
BLAY 1980-1997 54 766
Private credit by other
bank-like institutions to
GDP
BLCY 1980-1997 43 652
Financial structure and development variables
Overhead costs of the
banking system relative
to banking system assets
BOHC 1990-1997 129 719
Private credit by deposit
money banks to GDP
(Bank credit ratio)
DBPCY 1960-1997 160 3901
Private credit by de-
posit money banks and
other ﬁnancial institu-
tions to GDP (Private
credit ratio)
TIPCY 1960-1997 161 3923BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 57
Table 1
(continued)
Deﬁnition Variable Time span Coun- Obser-
tries vations
Stock market capitalisa-
tion to GDP (Market
capitalisation ratio)
SMCY 1976-1997 93 1171
Stock market total value
traded to GDP (Total
value traded ratio)
SMVY 1975-1997 93 1264
Notes: 1) The database on banking crises includes the two qualitative vari-
ables included here. A banking crisis is deﬁned as systemic if most or all banking
system capital is eroded by loan losses (5% of assets in developing countries). A
non systemic banking crisis includes borderline and smaller banking crises (see
Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996 and 2002). 2) The complete ﬁnancial development
and structure database includes statistics on the size, activity and eﬃciency of
various intermediaries (commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds
and non-deposit money banks) and markets (primary equity and primary and
secondary bond markets).
The sample was built according to data availability. It includes
data for Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Germany, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Namibia,
Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe. Thus the sample includes data for 47 countries over the
period 1990-1997.
We deﬁne eleven individual indicators to describe the banking
and ﬁnancial environment of each country. We organise the indicators
in three assortments. The assortment of banking indicators contains
measures of concentration, origin and ownership of commercial banks.
Furthermore it contains measures of the activity and size of banks
relative to that of bank-like institutions. The assortment of structural
indicators contains measures of the activity, size and eﬃciency of stock
markets relative to that of banks. The assortment of development58 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
indicators contains measures of the activity, size and eﬃciency of
stock markets and banks.
The banking assortment is integrated by ﬁve indicators. The
ﬁrst three are the Banking-Concentration, the Banking-Domestic and
the Banking-Public indicators. The ﬁrst measures the ratio of three
largest banks to total banking assets.7 The second and third ones
measure the respective shares of domestic and public ownership of
commercial banks. The last two indicators are Banking-Activity and
Banking-Size. Large values of these indicators are associated with
high levels of credit activity and with a large size of banks relative
to those of bank-like institutions. We include these indicators as
complementary measures of competition.
We follow Levine (2002) to build the individual ﬁnancial system
indicators. Such indicators are organised into two assortments: The
structural assortment includes the Structure-Activity, Structure-Size
and Structure-Eﬃciency indicators.8 In this assortment market-based
ﬁnancial systems are associated with large values of the indicators
while bank-based ones are associated with small values. The ﬁnan-
cial development assortment is integrated by the Finance-Activity,
Finance-Size and Finance-Eﬃciency indicators.9 In this assortment
ﬁnancial development is associated with large values of the indicators,
while underdevelopment is associated with small ones.
7 We are aware that this ratio is a very rough measure of banking concentra-
tion and an arguable measure of banking competition. However this is the only
measure available to capture the structure of the banking industry.
8 Levine (2002) uses these three indicators to assess the structure of ﬁnan-
cial systems. Structure-Activity equals the logarithm of the total value traded
ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. Structure-Size equals the logarithm of the
market capitalization ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. Structure-Eﬃciency
equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times overhead costs. These
indicators try to assess the activity, size and eﬃciency of stock markets relative to
that of banks. However, we must point out that Levine (2002) indicates that the
third indicator cannot be considered a very good measure of ﬁnancial structure.
Here we include it in the assessments for completeness and consistency purposes.
9 Levine (2002) uses these three indicators to assess the degree to which na-
tional ﬁnancial systems provide ﬁnancial services. Finance-Activity equals the
logarithm of the total value traded ratio times the private credit ratio. Finance-
Size equals the logarithm of the market capitalization ratio times the private
credit ratio. Finance-Eﬃciency equals the logarithm of the total value traded
ratio divided by overhead costs. Levine (2002) indicates that the second indicator
cannot be considered a very good measure of ﬁnancial development. As in the case
of the Structure-Eﬃciency indicator, we use it for completeness and consistency
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Moreover we build two aggregate indicators to summarise the in-
formation content of each assortment of individual indicators. Again,
we follow Levine (2002) in deﬁning and constructing them. Speciﬁ-
cally each aggregate indicator is deﬁned as the ﬁrst linear combination
of the three individual indicators that integrate each ﬁnancial assort-
ment. Thus the three aggregate indicators summarise the relevant
information of the environment. These indicators are the Structure-
Aggregate and Finance-Aggregate ones. Here it is important to point
out that the eight ﬁnancial indicators used here are the conventional
ones used to assess the merits of diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems.
We use ﬁrst principal-components to capture what may be com-
mon to all the indicators that integrate an assortment of correlated
variables. Given the lack of empirical deﬁnitions for ﬁnancial devel-
opment and ﬁnancial structure, we use the aggregate indicators as
indexes of scale for the level of ﬁnancial development and for the
relative prominence of markets in the ﬁnancial system. We do not
use an equivalent measure for banking competition because the in-
terpretation of the aggregate index becomes unclear without further
microeconomic assumptions.
The set of banking and ﬁnancial indicators is summarised in the
following table:
Table 2
Banking and Financial Indicators
Name Deﬁnition Measurement
Banking fragility indicators
Crisis Binary variable for fragility: Banking
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Notes: Large values of the banking activity and size indicators are associated
to banking institutions; small ones to bank-like ones. Large values of the ﬁnancial
structure indicators are associated to market-based ﬁnancial systems; small ones
to bank-based ones. Large values of the ﬁnancial development indicators relate
to high levels of ﬁnancial development.
4. Methodological Issues Concerning the Assessment of the
Stylised Facts
OLS regressions allow us to determine certain empirical associations
between the banking and ﬁnancial indicators. They are used to anal-
yse how the ﬁnancial situation of banking systems may aﬀect the as-
sociations between banking competition and ﬁnancial structure and
between banking competition and ﬁnancial development. We denom-
inate such associations as the stylised facts between banking compe-
tition and ﬁnancial systems. The regressions will allow us to establish
such stylised facts by comparing the outcomes of speciﬁc sets of OLS
regressions.
The stylised facts are assessed with four OLS regression sets. Each
set studies speciﬁc banking and ﬁnancial relationships. The ﬁrst set
studies the relationships between the banking market structure and
bank-like indicators. The second set studies the relationships of the62 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
banking indicators with respect to the ﬁnancial development ones.
The third set studies the relationships of the banking indicators with
respect to the ﬁnancial structure ones. Here it is important to recall
that our focus is merely on the empirical associations. Thus the
regressions do not aim at clarifying any causality.
Each regression set allows us to analyze speciﬁc relationships
through the comparison of the outcomes of the subsets that integrate
each set. Each set is integrated by subsets of three single-variable
regressions that describe the association between a speciﬁc pair of
indicators for diﬀerent data samples. In each subset, the ﬁrst re-
gression estimates an association using all the sampled data. The
second and third regressions re-estimate the same association using
two data sub-samples that are diﬀerentiated according to the fragility
indicator.
Comparisons among the regressions allow us to progressively de-
ﬁne the stylised facts associated with the banking and ﬁnancial indi-
cators. Note that the outcomes of each subset of regressions allow us
to analyse how the ﬁnancial situation of banking systems may aﬀect
the associations between speciﬁc pairs of indicators. These outcomes
may show that certain associations can be consistent in spite of the
ﬁnancial situation that the banking system of a country may be ex-
periencing. The existence of consistent associations in a subset of
regressions allows us to deﬁne an empirical relationship. Consistent
relationships allow us to deﬁne an empirical stylised fact.
5. Failure-Determinant Methodology and the Assessment of
Fragility Determinants
Here we discuss how we assess the eﬀects of banking competition de-
terminants on banking fragility. In spite of the fact that our approach
is developed along the lines of the failure-determinant literature, we
believe that it is important to emphasise that we use logit models for
panel data. We emphasise this feature because traditional studies use
a multivariate logit approach to analyse the determinants of banking
crises.10 Statistically, our panel-data approach allows us to combine
the properties of time-series and cross-sectional data for estimation
purposes. Furthermore, it allows us to take advantage of all the data
available.
10 Classic studies that use the multivariate logit approach are Demirguc-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998) and (2000) and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999).BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 63
Here we use logit models for panel data to assess the determi-
nants of fragility. We assume logistic functions because logit mod-
els have statistical advantages over probit ones in terms of estima-
tor consistency and parsimony of assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002).
Furthermore, we focus on estimations with ﬁxed-eﬀects to get rid
of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity among the countries anal-
ysed. Statistically, ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations are adequate as long as
we can reject, for estimations with random-eﬀects, the null hypothe-
sis that the fraction of the total variance due to idiosyncratic errors
is zero.11
The traditional ﬁnancial fragility literature includes indicator
sets that capture the main characteristics of the environment (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998 and 2000). The matrix of in-
dependent K vector-variables xit = xit1,xit2,...,xitK describes the
environment through the inclusion of failure-determinant and control
variables. In our study, the former variables include the banking in-
dicators while the latter variables include the ﬁnancial structure and
development indicators.12 Thus, in our case the matrix is deﬁned as:
xit =[ Bit,S it,F it] (1)
Where
Mit Vector of banking indicators
Sit Vector of ﬁnancial structure indicators
Fit Vector of ﬁnancial development indicators
Panel-data techniques allow us to use the data available. We con-
sider this feature important not only for estimation purposes, but also
11 The null hypothesis is expressed as Ho:ρ=0. The intuition underlying this
hypothesis is that random eﬀects are close to ﬁxed eﬀects when the estimated
variance of unobserved eﬀects, σ
2
c, is relatively large compared to the variance of
the idiosyncratic errors, σ
2







12 We are aware that some important control variables are omitted due to the
absence of data. Relevant omissions include variables to describe diﬀerent regula-
tory regimes such as deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements and deposit
rate ceilings. We agree with a referee who pointed out that regulatory regimes
may have diﬀerentiated impacts on banking fragility. Currently, the only public
database on banking regulatory and supervision practices is the one of Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2001). Unfortunately the time span and country coverage of
this database do not coincide with the ones of our study.64 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
because of the potential generality of the estimation results. Such re-
sults may be obtained by consistent estimations of the coeﬃcient vec-
tor β =[ βB,β S,β F]. Here we denominate the linear functional form
of the logit models that relates xit and β as the banking-competition
speciﬁcation. This linear functional form will be used for the em-
pirical estimations of the failure-determinant models. Linearity is a
traditional convention in the failure-determinant literature.
The analysis of how competition may aﬀect the stability of bank-
ing systems depends on several estimations of the coeﬃcient vector
β. We use these estimations to clarify the nature of the eﬀects of
the banking industry determinants. Like other failure-determinant
studies, a clear limitation of the analysis refers to the potential exis-
tence of endogeneity. This limitation is rarely, if ever, mentioned in
failure-determinant studies. Endogeneity can arise due to the omis-
sion of relevant variables, due to measurement errors or because of
simultaneity. We are aware of this potential statistical problem. We
deal with it by using further empirical regressions and assuming that
causality can be established under certain empirical premises.
Endogenity is not only an econometric problem. Endogeneity
and causality issues can arise because it is very diﬃcult to disentangle
the notion of banking fragility from the state of development and the
structure of ﬁnancial systems and the degree of banking competition.
Our study is based on the premise that the design of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, the level of ﬁnancial development and banking competition are
exogenous to the phenomenon of ﬁnancial crises. However, we must
recognise that this is a very restrictive premise for the assessment and
interpretation of the econometric results.13
We deal with endogeneity issues based on further panel-data re-
gressions and further empirical assumptions. We use random-eﬀects
logit regressions to deal with the issues of omitted variable bias and
sample size associated with ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations.14 We use such
13 Such restrictiveness can be understood in terms of the interpretation of the
empirical results: Suppose that for a given set of results we establish that ﬁnancial
underdevelopment and the lack of banking competition causes ﬁnancial fragility
(in line with our main premise). However, it may be perfectly reasonable to think
about banking fragility in terms of a manifestation of ﬁnancial underdevelopment
and, by extension, of banking ineﬃciency and the lack of banking competition.
Under the latter interpretation, we suggest the existence of simultaneity, but not
of causality.
14 Wooldridge (2002, p. 252), indicates: “This approach (with random ef-
fects) is certainly appropriate from an omitted variables or neglected heterogene-
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regressions to analyse statistical consistency. We deal with the causal-
ity issue by assuming that each view on the relationship between com-
petition and fragility predicts certain signs for the estimated coeﬃ-
cients. Speciﬁcally, the view that assumes that competition enhances
fragility predicts that all the estimated coeﬃcients will be negative.
The opposite view predicts positive ones. Finally the third view pre-
dicts that they will be diﬀerentiated or non signiﬁcant.15
6. Econometric Assessment of Stylised Facts
Here we report the regression results associated with the assessment
of the stylised facts between competition and ﬁnancial systems. First
we report the results used to investigate the relationships among the
individual indicators. Speciﬁcally, we report the results related to the
relationships between banking competition and ﬁnancial development
and between banking competition and ﬁnancial structure. Then we
report the results associated with the set of aggregate indicators. Fi-
nally we summarise the results of the three regression sets. In all the
regressions we have included a constant term to eliminate constant
eﬀects.
The ﬁrst regression set analyses the associations between ﬁnan-
cial development and banking competition indicators. We summarise
the econometric results in the table 3.
Table 3 shows diﬀerentiated relationships among the banking
competition and ﬁnancial development indicators according to fragili-
ty. Particularly it suggests that the degree of ﬁnancial development is
low in countries with concentrated banking systems. All the estimated
regressions between the concentration and development indicators are
negative and signiﬁcant. Moreover, the comparisons among data
samples suggest that this relationship is magniﬁed during episodes
of banking crises. The coeﬃcients β and R2 are relatively higher
and more statistically signiﬁcant for the sample involving episodes of
banking fragility.
ﬁxed-eﬀects models would lead us to losses in the number of degrees of freedom.
15 We assume that the competitive behaviour of banking systems depends on
speciﬁc features of the local banking industry (low banking concentration, open-
ness to foreign incumbents, proﬁt maximisation driven by private banks and the
existence of providers of substitute ﬁnancial services). We are aware that these
assumptions are particularly strong for empirical purposes. However the available
data do not allow us to address this issue more properly.66 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Table 3
Banking Competition and Financial Development
(Regression Analysis)
Regressor All Observations Stable Banking Fragile Banking
Indicator Systems Systems
(1) (2) (3)
β R2 β R2 β R2
(t) (t) (t)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Concentration
Finance -.03** .10 -.04*** .07 -.04*** .07
Activity (-4.85 ) (-3.98) (-3.25)
Finance -.04*** .04 -.03** .03 -.06*** .07
Size (-3.54) (-2.47) (-2.73)
Finance -.03*** .04 -.03*** .03 -.04*** .07
Eﬃciency (-3.57) (-2.76) (-2.74)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Domestic
Finance .02*** .08 .04*** .22 .00 .02
Activity (4.85 ) (4.85) (1.60)
Finance .03*** .09 .05*** .17 .01* .03
Size (5.10) (5.60) (1.85)
Finance .02*** .07 .03*** .17 .01 .02
Eﬃciency (4.31) (5.70) (1.54)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Public
Finance .05 .01 -.17 .05 .38*** .51
Activity (.69 ) (-.95) (4.70)
Finance -.01 .00 -.20 .04 .81*** .42
Size (-.08) (-.95) (3.63)
Finance .10 .03 -.33 .10 .46*** .70
Eﬃciency (1.09) (-1.48) (6.48)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Activity
Finance -.06* .01 -.03 .00 -.09** .07
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Table 3
(continued)
Regressor All Observations Stable Banking Fragile Banking
Indicator Systems Systems
(1) (2) (3)
β R2 β R2 β R2
(t) (t) (t)
Finance -.18*** .05 -.13* .02 -.22*** .15
Size (-3.17) (-1.68) (-3.12)
Finance -.13*** .06 -.12* .03 -.15*** .13
Eﬃciency (-3.17) (-1.95) (-2.74)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Size
Finance -.00 .00 .01 .00 -.02 .00
Activity (-.20) (.24) (-.46)
Finance .01 .00 .04 .00 -.00 .00
Size (.32) (.55) (-.02)
Finance -.06 .01 -.08 .01 -.05 .01
Eﬃciency (-1.49) (-1.34) (-.94)
Notes: The regressions use OLS to estimate equations of the form: y=α+βx,
where y and x are the regressed and regressor indicators, respectively. The re-
gressions use diﬀerent observations for comparison purposes. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst
column refers to regressions that include all the observations. The second column
refers to regressions that include observations for which the banking fragility vari-
able is equal to zero. The third column refers to the ones for which the banking
fragility variable is equal to one. Each column contains the estimate of β, the
t-statistic of this estimate (in parentheses) and the R
2 value of the regression.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent
respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients for constants are not reported.
An interesting ﬁnding is that ﬁnancial development indicators
are positively correlated to the share of domestic-owned banks. The
regressions are statistically signiﬁcant in most cases. In addition, this
relationship is magniﬁed during stability periods. We are aware that
this ﬁnding may be counter-intuitive on the basis that foreign banks68 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
may induce competition and incentives for innovation. However this
ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that domestic bankers may have
better knowledge of the local market. Also, this ﬁnding is consistent
in terms of the positive correlation between ﬁnancial and banking
development: In developed banking systems domestic banks may be
more stable and less likely to be purchased by foreign banks.
According to the regressions, public banking might enhance ﬁ-
nancial development. Comparisons among the associations suggest
that the relationships between ﬁnancial development and public bank-
ing depend on the stability of banking systems. The evidence shows
that ﬁnancial development indicators are positively correlated to the
share of public-owned banks only when the banking systems are ex-
periencing crises. Otherwise, the estimations are neither consistent
nor signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding may reﬂect public eﬀorts to deal with
banking crises and to stabilise banking systems.
Other ﬁndings suggest that the degree of ﬁnancial development is
low in countries with relatively active banking systems. Almost all the
estimated regressions between the banking activity and ﬁnancial de-
velopment indicators are negative and signiﬁcant. Furthermore, as in
the case of the concentration indicator, the comparisons among data
samples suggest that this relationship is magniﬁed during episodes
of banking crises. The coeﬃcients β and R2 are relatively higher
and more statistically signiﬁcant for the sample involving episodes of
banking fragility.
The second regression set analyses the relationships between ﬁ-
nancial structure and banking competition. We summarise the results
of the regression set of individual indicators in the table 4.
Table 4 also shows diﬀerentiated relationships among the bank-
ing competition and ﬁnancial structure indicators according to bank-
ing fragility. It suggests that concentrated banking systems prevail
in bank-based ﬁnancial systems. Financial structure indicators are
negatively correlated to the ratio of the three largest banks to total
banking assets. Although this main ﬁnding is not surprising per se,
the comparisons among samples suggest that this relationship is mag-
niﬁed during banking stability periods. Both β and R2 are relatively
high and statistically signiﬁcant for the sample involving episodes of
banking stability.
An unexpected ﬁnding is that ﬁnancial structure indicators are
positively correlated to the share of domestic-owned banks. The es-
timated regressions are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in most
cases. Moreover, the comparisons among samples suggest that such
association is magniﬁed during banking stability periods. Such ﬁnd-BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 69
ings may suggest that a high degree of foreign penetration prevails in
bank-based ﬁnancial systems. However our ﬁndings also show that the
property regime of banks does not matter when the banking systems
are unstable.
Table 4
Banking Competition and Financial Structure
(Regression Analysis)
Regressor All Observations Stable Banking Fragile Banking
Indicator Systems Systems
(1) (2) (3)
β R2 β R2 β R2
(t) (t) (t)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Concentration
Structure -.05*** .05 -.08*** .10 -.03 .02
Activity (-3.95) (-4.67) (-1.56)
Structure -.00 .00 -.04 .00 .05 .01
Size (-.02) (-1.26) (1.17)
Structure -.04*** .05 -.06*** .09 -.03* .03
Eﬃciency (-3.98) (-4.43) (-1.69)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Domestic
Structure .03*** .06 .07*** .21 .01 .01
Activity (4.11 ) (6.46) (1.22)
Structure .04*** .03 .07*** .05 .01 .00
Size (2.70) (3.00) (84)
Structure .02*** .06 .04*** .16 .01 .02
Eﬃciency (3.91) (5.44) (1.44)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Public
Structure .16 .05 -.75* .15 .44*** .65
Activity (1.54) (-1.75) (6.35)
Structure .33 .03 -2.84*** .42 .97*** .66
Size (1.26) (-3.68) (6.01)70 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Table 4
(continued)
Regressor All Observations Stable Banking Fragile Banking
Indicator Systems Systems
(1) (2) (3)
β R2 β R2 β R2
(t) (t) (t)
Structure .08 .01 -.28 .07 .35*** .46
Eﬃciency (.88) (-1.24) (3.93)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Activity
Structure -.06 .00 -.03 .00 -.07 .01
Activity (-1.08) (-.42) (-.87)
Structure -.35*** .03 -.40** .04 -.19 .01
Size (-2.65) (-2.28) (-.98)
Structure -.07 .00 -.01 .00 -.12 .04
Eﬃciency (-1.15) (-.12) (-1.54)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Size
Structure -.04 .00 -.09 .01 .02 .00
Activity (-.84) (-1.20) (.34)
Structure -.10 .00 -.56*** .07 .37** .07
Size (-.84) (-3.17) (2.30)
Structure .01 .00 .01 .00 .01 .00
Eﬃciency (.34) (.18) (.23)
Notes: The regressions use OLS to estimate equations of the form: y=α+βx,
where y and x are the regressed and regressor indicators, respectively. The re-
gressions use diﬀerent observations for comparison purposes. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst
column refers to regressions that include all the observations. The second column
refers to regressions that include observations for which the banking fragility vari-
able is equal to zero. The third column refers to the ones for which the banking
fragility variable is equal to one. Each column contains the estimate of β, the
t-statistic of this estimate (in parentheses) and the R
2 value of the regression.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent
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The regressions show diﬀerentiated associations between the pub-
lic banking indicator with respect to ﬁnancial development. Such dif-
ferentiation depends on the ﬁnancial situation of the banking system.
Our ﬁndings suggest that private banks prevail in bank-based ﬁnan-
cial systems during banking fragility periods. But they also suggest
that public banks prevail in bank-based systems during stable ones.I n
both cases the regression coeﬃcients are mostly signiﬁcant. However,
according to β and R2, it is likely that the former association might
prevail as a relationship.
Not surprisingly, our ﬁndings show that the relative prominence
of banks with respect to bank-like institutions characterises bank-based
ﬁnancial systems. In most regressions, the ﬁnancial structure indi-
cators are negatively correlated to the banking activity and banking
size ones. Moreover, such relationships are magniﬁed during banking
crises. Interestingly, the regressions show that the size of banks in-
creases in bank-based ﬁnancial systems during fragility periods. But
they also suggest that the size of banks increases in market-based
ﬁnancial systems during stability periods.
The third regression set analyses the relationships between the
banking and ﬁnancial aggregate indexes. We summarise the results
of the regression set of indicators in the table 5.
Table 5 shows that the aggregate ﬁnancial indicators are neg-
atively correlated to the banking indicators of concentration, activ-
ity and size and positively with the domestic one. These ﬁndings
suggest that banking concentration, the relative prominence of banks
and foreign ownership are associated with bank-based ﬁnancial sys-
tems and ﬁnancial underdevelopment. As before, the consistency and
robustness of these associations depends on banking fragility. Fur-
thermore the regressions suggest that public banking is associated
with market-based ﬁnancial systems and ﬁnancial development during
banking crises.
We summarise by indicating that the ﬁnancial situation prevail-
ing in the banking systems (the stable or the fragile ones), emphasises
speciﬁc associations between ﬁnancial development and the bank-
ing competition determinants. Concretely, banking crises emphasise
the negative correlations between ﬁnancial development with banking
concentration and the relative prominence of banking over bank-like
institutions. They also emphasise the positive correlations between ﬁ-
nancial development and public banking. Stability periods emphasise
the positive correlation between ﬁnancial development and domesti-
cally owned banks.
The ﬁnancial situation also emphasises speciﬁc associations be-72 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
tween ﬁnancial structure and banking competition. Our ﬁndings show
that banking crises emphasise the associations between bank-based ﬁ-
nancial systems and the relative activity of banking institutions; and
the associations between market-based ﬁnancial systems and public
banking. Furthermore they also show that banking stability peri-
ods emphasise the associations of bank-based ﬁnancial systems with
banking concentration, public banking and the relative size of banking
institutions, and the associations of market-based ﬁnancial systems
with domestically owned banks.
Table 5
Banking and Financial Aggregate Indicators
(Regression Analysis)
Regressor All Observations Stable Banking Fragile Banking
Indicator Systems Systems
(1) (2) (3)
β R2 β R2 β R2
(t) (t) (t)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Concentration
Finance -.05*** .05 -.05*** .04 -.07*** .09
Aggregate (-3.85 ) (-2.85) (-2.93)
Structure -.04*** .02 -.07*** .06 -.02 .00
Aggregate (-2.61) (-3.51) (-.81)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Domestic
Finance .03*** .09 .05*** .20 .02* .04
Aggregate (4.96) (5.98) (1.91)
Structure .02*** .06 .05*** .17 .01 .02
Aggregate (3.87) (5.40) (1.38)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Public
Finance .12 .01 -.33 .06 -.80*** .66
Aggregate (.72) (-1.08) (5.24)
Structure .15 .04 -.77* .18 -.45*** .62
Aggregate (1.24) (-1.94) (4.80)BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 73
Table 5
(continued)
Regressor All Observations Stable Banking Fragile Banking
Indicator Systems Systems
(1) (2) (3)
β R2 β R2 β R2
(t) (t) (t)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Activity
Finance -.23*** .07 -.21** .04 -.25*** .17
Aggregate (-3.54) (-2.14) (-3.19)
Structure -.21** .03 -.22 .02 -.20* .07
Aggregate (-2.50) (-1.60) (-1.93)
Regressed indicator: Banking-Size
Finance -.06 .00 -.08 .00 -.06 .00
Aggregate (-.94) (-.81) (-.71)
Structure -.04 .00 -.28** .03 .07 .00
Aggregate (-.61) (-1.99) (.71)
Notes: The regressions use OLS to estimate equations of the form: y=α+βx,
where y and x are the regressed and regressor indicators, respectively. The re-
gressions use diﬀerent observations for comparison purposes. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst
column refers to regressions that include all the observations. The second column
refers to regressions that include observations for which the banking fragility vari-
able is equal to zero. The third column refers to the ones for which the banking
fragility variable is equal to one. Each column contains the estimate of β, the
t-statistic of this estimate (in parentheses) and the R
2 value of the regression.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent
respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients for constants are not reported.
We conclude by pointing out that the evidence suggests diﬀeren-
tiated associations among the banking and ﬁnancial indicators. The
stylised facts suggest that banking concentration, foreign ownership
and the relative activity and size of banks with respect to those of
bank-like institutions are associated with bank-based ﬁnancial systems
and ﬁnancial underdevelopment. They also suggest that domestically74 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
and publicly owned banks may prevail in market-based and ﬁnancially
developed ﬁnancial systems, at least, during banking crisis episodes.
7. Econometric Assessment of the Eﬀects of the Banking
Determinants
Here we report the outcomes of the two sets of failure-determinant
models that estimate the banking-competition speciﬁcation deﬁned
by equation (1). These outcomes complement the previous OLS re-
gressions. Furthermore the outcomes will allow us to compare the
evidence with the alternative theoretical predictions regarding the ef-
fects of banking competition on banking fragility. But they will also
allow us to analyse the speciﬁc and joint eﬀects of banking competi-
tion determinants on fragility. In all the estimations we have included
the aggregate ﬁnancial indicators as control variables.
The ﬁrst set of failure determinants models focuses on the spe-
ciﬁc eﬀects of the banking determinants on banking fragility. We
summarise the results of this set of failure-determinant models in the
following table:
Table 6
Banking Competition and Financial Fragility
(Fixed Eﬀects Logit Models for Panel Data)
/Model Concen- Domestic Public Activity Size
tration
Regression Indicators
Structure -1.37** -2.26*** -2.02 -3.32*** -2.11**
Aggregate (-2.05) (-2.56) (-.67) (-2.75) (-2.08)
Finance .36 1.72 2.50 .80 .28
Aggregate (.44) (1.55) (.76) (.73) (.27)
Banking -1.65 – – – –
Concentra. (-1.24)
Banking – 19.15* – – –
Domestic (1.84)
Banking – – 13.09 – –
Public (1.25)BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 75
Table 6
(continued)
/Model Concen- Domestic Public Activity Size
tration
Regression Indicators
Banking – – – 3.05*** –
Activity (2.81)
Banking – – – – 2.24**
Size (2.08)
Observa- 139 112 18 75 74
tions
LR-CHI2 10.55** 12.80*** 2.62 21.87*** 11.12**
Prob>chi2 .0144 .0051 .4539 .0001 .0111
Log Likeli- -51.70 -40.61 -7.36 -21.24 -25.30
hood
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The z statistics
are given in parenthesis and are based on IRLS variance estimators. One, two
and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
Table 6 shows the diﬀerentiated eﬀects of the speciﬁc banking
competition determinants on ﬁnancial fragility. In particular, the
analysis shows that concentration enhances the stability of banking
systems, and that banking credit activity enhances their fragility.
However, none of the determinants are statistically signiﬁcant. Fur-
thermore, the evidence suggests that ﬁnancial underdevelopment and
the orientation toward market-based ﬁnancial systems might enhance
banking stability. In fact, all the coeﬃcient estimations of the signiﬁ-
cant ﬁnancial structure indicators are negative. Thus the estimations
support the idea that ﬁnancial structure matters to assess banking
performance.
Further results oﬀer weak evidence that the larger the share
of public and domestically owned banks, or the larger the size of
the banking sector with respect to that of bank-like institutions, the
higher probability that banking crises will occur. Thus, the regres-
sions suggest that the performance of the banking system may depend76 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
on the property regime of banks. This conclusion ﬁnds support in
other banking studies.16 However the evidence is not conclusive, be-
cause only the domestic ownership coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant. Moreover,
it could be argued that the public banking coeﬃcient may appear as
a consequence of government eﬀorts to deal with banking crises.
How might the joint eﬀects of banking competition determinants
aﬀect ﬁnancial fragility? We explore this question with a set of panel-
data regressions that include multiple banking determinants, follow-
ing the Sargan-and-Hendry approach in building it. This approach
allows us to dismiss the possibility of speciﬁcation and model selection
problems. Hence we show the outcomes of a general regression model
that includes all the fragility determinants and the outcomes of sim-
pliﬁed models of it. Then we use log likelihood and z-statistics tests in
order to simplify the model and to choose among several alternative
regression speciﬁcations.
The second set includes ﬁxed-eﬀects panel-data regressions that
focus on the joint eﬀects of banking determinants on fragility, follow-
ing the guidelines indicated above. We summarise the results of this
set of failure-determinant models in the table 7.
The table 7 conﬁrms that banking competition determinants
have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on ﬁnancial fragility. The regressions con-
ﬁrm that the relative credit activity of banks signiﬁcantly enhances
the fragility of banking systems. They conﬁrm that ﬁnancial develop-
ment also enhances it. In most models, the estimated determinants
are consistent. Furthermore, the evidence conﬁrms that the orien-
tation toward market-based ﬁnancial systems might enhance stability.
In fact, all the coeﬃcient estimations of the signiﬁcant ﬁnancial struc-
ture indicators are negative. Thus the estimations also conﬁrm that
ﬁnancial structure matters in assessing banking performance.
The second regression set oﬀers additional information on the
relationship between banking competition and ﬁnancial fragility. Ac-
cording to statistical tests, the best parsimonious speciﬁcation that
describes such relationship corresponds to the fourth simpliﬁed model.
This speciﬁcation includes indicators of ﬁnancial structure, domestic
ownership and relative activity of banks as explanatory variables.17
Other results in the regression set seem to contradict our previous
16 See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005).
17 We arrive at this conclusion by using the log likelihood indicators in the
fourth and ﬁfth simpliﬁed models. According to an omitted variables-ratio test,
the inclusion of the Banking Domestic indicator is relevant for speciﬁcation testing
purposes. With a level of signiﬁcance of 0.01 χ
2
1=6.63, the null hypothesis of no
incorrect omission is rejected [LR=-2(-21.52+15.04) =12.96].Table 7
Banking Competition and Financial Fragility
(Fixed Eﬀects Logit Models for Panel Data)
/Model General Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Regression indicators
Structure Agregate 4.59 -4.68** -3.30** -3.55*** -3.67*** - 2.78***
(.) (-2.38) (-2.39) (-2.60) (-2.91) (2.95)
Finance Agregate 18.76 3.21 – – – –
(.) (1.06)
Banking Concentration -32.49 5.77 2.33 – – –
(.00) (1.10) (.70)
Banking Domestic -235.89 16.84 -8.51 -3.81 -9.28 –
(.) (.47) (-.36) (-.17) (-.69)
Banking Public -40.19 – – – – –
(.)
Banking Activity 12.01 4.17 3.45 3.23 3.26** 2.90***
(.) (.80) (.82) (.77) (2.28) (2.78)
Banking Size 12.02 2.18 .97 .29 – –
(.) (.38) (.20) (.06)Table 7
(continued)
/Model General Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed Simpliﬁed
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Observations 6 55 55 55 64 75
LR-CHI2 5.42** 19.92*** 18.67*** 18.17*** 23.32*** 21.32
Prob > chi2 .0200 .0029 .0022 .0011 .0000 .0000
Log Likelihood .00 -12.91 -13.54 -13.79 -15.04 -21.52
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and are based on
IRLS variance estimators. One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.BANKI NG COMPETI TI ON AND FI NANCI AL FRAGI LI TY 79
¯ndings regarding the e®ects of banking concentration and domestic
ownership. However none of the estimated coe±cients are signi¯cant.
What e®ect might banking competition have on ¯nancial fragil-
ity? According to the both regression sets, it is likely th a t ba n kin g
determ i nants have di ®erenti ated e®ects. Speci¯cally, if credit activity
relies on banking institutions or if the orientation of the ¯nancial sys-
tem is bank-based, the outcomes suggest that banking fragility will be
increased. Furthermore, both regression sets o®er weak evidence that
¯nancial development and, particularly, the property regime matters.
Indeed the Banking-Domestic indicator seems necessary to avoid mis-
speci¯cation problems. However none of the indicators are statisti-
cally signi¯cant.
We support our results with statistical tests and further regres-
sions. The overall signi¯cance of the variables used in the models is
supported with likelihood ratio tests. According to the Wald crite-
rion, all the models in both regression sets are signi¯cant (see tables
6 and 7). We assess the consistency and adequacy of the models with
further random-e®ects logit regressions (see the appendix), and con-
clude that the results obtained with the models are consistent and
that ¯xed-e®ects are necessary for estimation purposes. Moreover,
they also con¯rm that the Banking-Domestic indicator is necessary
for speci¯cation purposes.
We summarise by indicating that the evidence shows di ®erenti -
ated e® ects of the banking determinants on fragility. The outcomes
suggest that i fcredi tacti vi ty rel i es on banks or i fthe ¯nanci alsystem
is bank-based, the likelihood of crises w ill increase. Another outcome
is that the banki ng determ i nants,the f eatures ofthe ¯nanci alsystem
and the property regi m e ofbanks j oi ntl y m atter to analyse the likeli-
hood of crises. The results support the view that the relationship be-
tween banking competition and ¯nancial fragility involves more than
a trade-o®. They also support the idea that ¯nancial structure mat-
ters to assess fragility.
8.Concl usi onsand D i scussi on
The issue of how banking competition a®ects the stability of banking
s y s t e m si sn o tw e l lu n d e r s t o o d .H e r ew eh a v es h o w nt h er e s u l t so fa n
investigation regarding the clari¯cation of this issue by using panel-
data for 47 countries during the period 1990-1997. This investigation
has relied on an extension of the failure-determinant methodology
that uses a double-technique approach based on OLSregressions and¶ 80 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
¯xed-e®ects logit models for panel-data. We have aimed at clarifying
the stylised facts associated with the banking and ¯nancial indicators
and at assessing the speci¯c and joint e®ects of banking competition
determinants on ¯nancial fragility.
The evidence suggests di®erentiated associations among the ban-
king and ¯nancial indicators. The stylised facts suggest that banking
concentrati on,f orei gn ownershi p and the rel ati ve acti vi ty and si ze of
ba n ks w ith respect to tho se o f ba n k-like in stitu tio n s a re a ssocia ted w ith
bank-based ¯nanci alsystem s and ¯nanci alunderdevel opm ent.T h e y
also suggest that dom esti cal l y and publ i cl y owned banks m ay prevai l
in m a rket-ba sed a n d ¯ n a n cially d evelo ped ¯ n a n cia l system s,a tl e a s t
during banking crisis episodes. Apparently the ¯nancial situation
of banking systems matters in assessing the associations among the
indicators.
The models for panel-data show di ®er ent i at e de®e ct softhe bank-
ing determinants on fragility. The outcomes suggest that if cred it
acti vi ty rel i es on banks or i f the ¯nanci alsystem i s bank-based, the
l ikelihood ofcrises w illincrease. Another suggestion is that the ban k-
i ng determ i nants, the f eatures of the ¯nanci alsystem and the prop-
ert y regi m e ofbanksj oi nt l y m at t erto analyse the likelihood of crises.
The results support the view that the relationship between banking
competition and ¯nancial fragility involves more than a trade-o®. In
addition, they support the idea that ¯nancial structure matters in
assessing fragility.
The study leads to some interesting implications and suggestions
for further research and policy-making: The ¯rst one relates to the
property regime ofbanks. Our ¯ndings suggest that it is likely tha t th e
property regim e m atters in explaining ¯nancial fragility in spite of the
lack of statistical signi¯cance of the ownership indicators. Assuming
that public, private, domestic and foreign banks have di®erent goals
and experience, it is very likely that their behaviour may be di®erent
under the same economic and ¯nancial conditions. Such consider-
ations make us believe that further studies on the performance of
banks and their fragility should focus on the property regime.
We believe that one of the most surprising conclusions of our
study refers to banking concentration. Our panel-data models suggest
that concentration is nota signi¯cant determinant of fragility. This
18 ¯nding contradicts other studies and even our own intuition. Many
studies use this indicator as the m easure of competition. Moreover,
18 B eck, D em irguc-K unt and Levine (2003), am ong others, have considered
b a n k in g co n cen tra tio n a s a n im p o rta n t d eterm in a n t o f b a n k in g sta b ility.BANKI NG COMPETI TI ON AND FI NANCI AL FRAGI LI TY 81
policy-makers usually consider concentration as an important issue
whenever they discuss competitive and stability issues. Apparently
the inclusion of ¯xed-e®ects in our models reduces the signi¯cance of
the concentration indicator. Thus our results might indicate that the
e®ects supposedly caused by banking concentration, really depend on
time-constant country features.
Our study proposes some ideas relevant for the policy-making
process. The ¯rst one is that there are no general policy-making
strategies for dealing with ¯nancial stability issues. Our results im-
ply that such strategies should be \tailored" according to the speci¯c
features of the banking and ¯nancial sectors of the economy. Fur-
thermore, an important consideration pointed out by the supporters
of the view that banking competition involves more than a simple
trade-o®, is that perfect ¯nancial stability can be socially undesirable
(Allen and Gale, 2004a). Thus regulations should not always avoid
banking crises.
A ¯nal implication of our analysis is that ¯ n an cial stru ctu re af-
fects banking perform ance. The interactions among intermediaries
and ¯nancial markets seem to explain the likelihood of banking cri-
19 ses. Indeed, we believe that further research may be developed
along the guidelines of the literature of comparative ¯nancial systems
(Allen and Gale, 2000 and 2004b). Published studies describe some
empirical relationships between ¯nancial structure and crises (Allen,
2001 and Ruiz-Porras, 2006). However they do not study how ¯-
nancial and banking competition a®ects the stability of banks. Our
current e®orts are oriented along this direction.
19 W e are aw are that this argum ent is controversial. D em irguc-K unt and
H ui zi nga (2001),arri ve exactl y to the opposi te concl usi on through the anal ysi sof
th e d eterm in a n ts o f b a n k in g p ro ¯ ta b ility.¶ 82 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
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Ap pe n d i x
Here we show the estimation outcomes of the random-e®ects logit re-
gressions for panel-data used to assess the consistency of the models
i nt h em a i nt e x t .F u r t h e r m o r e ,w eu s et h e mt oa n a l y s et h ea d e q u a c y
of ¯xed-e®ects for modelling purposes. We develop these assessments
by reporting the outcomes of two sets of failure-determinant regres-
sions. As in the main text, the ¯rst set includes regressions to study
the e®ects ofthe speci¯c banking determinants ofbanking crises. The
second set includes regressions to study the joint e®ects of multiple
banking determinants using the Sargan-Hendry approach.¶ 84 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
The ¯rst set offailure-determinant regressions focuses on the spe-
ci¯c e®ects of banking determinants on banking fragility. We sum-
marise the results of this set of failure-determinant regressions in the
following table:
Tabl e A1
Speci¯c Failure-D eterm inant R egressions
(R andom E ® ects Logit R egressions for P anel D ata)
/M odel C oncen- D om estic P ubl ic A ctivity Size
tration
R egression Indicators
Structure -.49* -.25 -.42 -1. 95*** -1.08**
A ggregate (-1.90) (-.87) (-.83) (-3.13) (-2.07)
Fi nance -.32 -.51* -.37 .18 .05
A ggregate (-1.33) (-1.76) (-.69) (.52) (.15)
Ba nki ng -2.37*** { { { {
C oncentra. (-3.10)
Ba nki ng {2 . 4 4 {{{
Do me s t i c (1.45)
Ba nki ng {{ . 2 7 { {
Publ i c (.71)
Ba nki ng {{ { 1. 64*** {
Ac t i v i t y (2.97)
Ba nki ng {{ { { . 7 9
Si ze (1.46)
C onstant -2. 65*** -.90* -.54 -4. 75*** -2. 83***
(-4.13) (-1.86) (-.76) (-3.18) (-2.75)
O bserva- 261 220 35 153 158
tions
LR- CHI 2 13. 23*** 13. 37*** 9. 22** 24. 49*** 14. 59***
Pr ob> chi 2 . 0042 . 0039 . 0264 . 0000 . 0022
Log Li kel i - -125. 05 -105. 12 -17. 13 -64. 86 -74. 11
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Tabl e A1
(continued)
/M odel C oncen- D om estic P ubl ic A ctivity Size
tration
R egression Indicators
¾ 3. 58 3. 19 . 08 7. 49 5. 43 u
½ .7 9 .7 5 .0 0 .9 4 .8 9
CHI 2 ( Ho : ½ =0 ) 59. 19*** 52. 74*** . 00 48. 64*** 45. 67***
Pr ob> chi 2 . 000 . 000 . 497 . 000 . 000
N o tes: T h e d ep en d en t v a ria b le is th e b a n k in g crisis d u m m y. T h e z statistics
are given in parenthesis and are based on IR L S variance estim ators. O ne, tw o
and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance levels of10,5 and 1 percent respectively.
Table A1 shows results consistent w ith the ones of the main text
(table 6). The random-e®ects logit regressions con¯rm that bank-
ing credit activity, publicly- and domestically-owned banks might en-
hance the fragility of banking systems. They also con¯rm that the
orientation toward market-based ¯nancial systems enhances their sta-
bility. Furthermore, most of the random-e®ects regressions reject the
null hypothesis that the fraction of the total variance due to idiosyn-
cratic errors is zero. Such rejection shows that the estimations with
¯xed-e®ects, like the ones in the main text, are necessary for mod-
elling purposes.
The second set includes random-e®ects logit panel-data regres-
sions that focus on the joint e®ects of banking determinants. We
summarise the results of this second regression set in the following
table:
Tabl e A2
Joint Failure-D eterm inant R egressions
(R andom E ® ects Logit R egressions for P anel D ata)
/M odel C oncen- D om estic P ubl ic A ctivity Size
tration
R egression Indicators
Structure -151.99 -1.67** -1.47** -1.45** -1.49**
A ggregate (.) (-2.20) (-2.31) (-2.08) (-2.55)¶ 86 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
Tabl e A2
(continued)
/M odel C oncen- D om estic P ubl ic A ctivity Size
tration
R egression Indicators
Fi nance 255.09 0.39 { { {
A ggregate (.00) (.59)
Ba nki ng -154.32 2.32** 2.18* .11 {
C oncentra. (-.00) (1.99) (1.91) (.11)
Ba nki ng 332.76 .48 3.11 { {
D om estic (.) (.09) (.91)
Ba nki ng -344.33 { { { {
P u b lic (.)
B anki ng -89. 71 10. 14*** 10. 42*** 8. 21** 8.27**
Ac t i v i t y (.00) (2.85) (3.06) (2.29) (2.31)
B anki ng 57. 86 -8. 47*** -8. 98*** -7. 61** -7. 66**
Si ze (.) (-2.58) (-3.01) (-2.25) (-2.27)
C onstant 53. 01 -4. 18** -3. 66** -4. 72** -4. 83**
(.) (-2.33) (-2.53) (-2.12) (-2.46)
Ob s e r v a - 8 117 117 139 139
tions
LR- CHI 2 10. 59*** 27. 47*** 27. 06*** 30. 63*** 30. 61***
Pr ob> chi 2 . 0011 . 0001 . 0001 . 0000 . 0000
L o g L ik eli- .0 0 -4 5 .7 4 -4 5 .9 5 -5 5 .5 9 -5 5 .6 0
hood
¾ .0 0 5 .0 1 4 .5 5 2 .6 9 2 .7 3 u
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Tabl e A2
(continued)
/M odel C oncen- D om estic P ubl ic A ctivity Size
tration
R egression Indicators
CHI 2 ( Ho : ½ =0 ) . 00 9. 17*** 12. 62*** 13. 54*** 16. 79***
Pr ob> chi 2 1. 00 . 001 . 000 . 000 . 000
N o tes: T h e d ep en d en t v a ria b le is th e b a n k in g crisis d u m m y. T h e z statistics
are given in parenthesis and are based on IR L S variance estim ators. O ne, tw o
and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance levels of10,5 and 1 percent respectively.
Table A2 also shows results consistent w ith the ones of the main
text (table 7). The random-e®ects logit regressions con¯rm that bank-
ing concentration and ¯nancial development might increase banking
fragility. They also con¯rm that the credit activity of bank-like in-
stitutions and market-based ¯nancial systems may enhance banking
stability. All the random-e®ects simpli¯ed regressions show that the
estimations with ¯xed-e®ects are necessary for modelling purposes.
Once again, according to an omitted variables-ratio, in this regression
set the Banking-Domestic indicator allows us to avoid misspeci¯ca-
20 tion problems.
20 W e a rriv e a t th is co n clu sio n b y u sin g th e lo g lik elih o o d in d ica to rs o f th e
second and thi rd si m pl i ¯ed regressi ons. A gai n w i th a l evel of si gni ¯cance of
2 0. 01 Â =6 :63, the null hyp othesis of no incorrect om ission is rejected [L R = -2(- 1
55. 59+ 45. 95) = 19. 28] .